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Article 2

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SUCCESSION TO
INTESTATE PROPERTY
(Continued)
"II. A second general rule or canon is, that the male issue shall be admitted before the female."
Blackstone's comment on this Canon. "Thus sons shall be
admitted before daughters; or, as our male lawgivers have
somewhat uncomplaisantly expressed it, the worthiest blood
shall be preferred. As if John Stiles hath two sons, Matthew
and Gilbert, and two daughters, Margaret and Charlotte,
and dies; first Matthew, and (in case of his death without
issue) then Gilbert shall be admitted to the succession in
preference to both the daughters.
"This preference of males to females is entirely agreeable to the law of succession among the Jews, and also
among the states of Greece, or at least among the
Athenians; but was totally unknown to the laws of
Rome (such of them I mean as are at present extant),
wherein brethren and sisters were allowed to succeed
to equal portions of the inheritance .... The true reason of preferring the males must be deduced from feodal
principles; for, by the genuine and original policy of that
constitution, no female could ever succeed to a proper feud,
inasmuch as they were incapable of performing those military services, for the sake of which that system was established. But our law does not extend to a total exclusion of
females, as the Salic law, and others, where feuds were most
strictly retained; it only postpones them to males; for
though daughters are excluded by sons, yet they succeed
before any collateral relations; our law . . . thus steering
a middle course between the absolute rejection of females
and the putting them on a footing with males." 1
1

2

L. CommL. 213, 214.
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Holdsworth's comment. "Even before the Conquest the
preference of males to females was the rule. 'This precedence is far older than feudalism, but the feudal influence
made for its retention or resuscitation.' 2 At the same time,
it is clear that as early as the reign of Henry I women
could inherit after men. We shall see that this preference
holds good not only in the descending, but also in the ascending line; and that, after some controversy, it has been
applied to ascertain the order in which the remotest collateral is entitled to inherit." ' In discussing the application of
this rule to remote collateral heirs who had descended from
lineal ascendants, Holdsworth says:' ". . . the Year Books
still kept open the question as to the priority between the
various ascendants on the father's or the mother's side. This
question was discussed in 1573 in the case of Clere v. Brook.
The pedigree in that case was as [set forth in Table VI] ...
TABLE VI
John Clere

John Young
Humphrey Young
Edward Young

DorothyEdward

lere

Willie Hadden=Margaret

I

Clere Hadden
(the purchaser)

"The question to be decided was whether Edward Young
or Edward Clere was the heir to Clere Hadden the purchaser. It was held that Edward Young was the heir, because the
ascendants in the paternal line and their descendants must
be exhausted before recourse can be had to the mother and
the maternal ascendants. So far the decision followed the
Year Book cases, and added nothing to the law. But Manwood, C. B., ventured on the dictum, assented to by the
2 Quoting from 2 POLLOCK AND MATLAND, THE HisTORY Or ENGLISH LAW
262.
3 3 HO.DSWORTH, A HISTORY Or ENGLISH LAW 140.
4 3 HOLnSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 149, 10, 151.
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judges of the court of Common Pleas, that if there is only
a question as between paternal ancestors, the descendants
of the less remote female paternal ancestor will be preferred
to the descendants of the more remote female paternal ancestor. For instance, the brother or sister of the purchaser's
[paternal] grandmother will be preferred to the brother or
sister of the purchaser's great-grandmother [paternal grandfather's mother] . This dictum seems at the time to have
been accepted as good law. Thus Bacon says, 'In the first
degree the law respecteth dignity of sex and not proximity;
and therefore the remote heir on the part of the father shall
have it before the near heir on the part of the mother; but
in any degree paramount the first, the law respecteth it not;
and therefore the near heir of the grandmother on the part
of the father shall have it before the remote heir of the
grandfather on the part of the father'; and the law is so
stated by Hale.
"But, after all, this opinion really rested on a dictum,
and, as Plowden and others saw, it was not a very logical
5 According to the argument of Manwood the heirs in class 10, Table I,
would be postponed to the heirs in class 11. Blackstone says that Bacon and
Hale adopted this view, on the theory that all the female ancestors on the part
of the father were equally worthy of blood, and so proximity should prevail.
2 BL. CoMm. 238. Yet Blackstone contended that class 10 should be preferred
to class 11 for the following reasons: (1) This point was not the principal question in the case of Clere v. Brook, and so the discussion of it was only obiter;
(2) It appears from.the report of this case that "many gentlemen of the law were
dissatisfied with this position of Justice Manwood," because the blood of the heirs
in case 10 was "derived to the purchaser through a greater number of males than
the blood" of the heirs in class 11, and so the members of class 10 were "more
worthy of the two"; (3) According to the eighth rule laid down by Hale, class
17 (which is analogous in the maternal line to class 10 in the paternal) is preferred to class 18 (which is analogous to class 11), and so to prefer class 11 to
class 10 would operate to destroy the symmetry of the legal course of descents;
(4) The view of Manwood destroys the preference of the male stocks in the law
of inheritance; (5) The reason given by Bacon (namely, that in any degree
paramount to the first the law respecteth proximity, and not dignity of blood)
is contra to many instances given by Plowden and Hale and other writers; and
(6) Manwood's view is contra to the doctrine of Coke, namely, that the blood
of the Kempes should not inherit till the blood of the Stileq failed. The blood of
the Stiles would not fail until both classes 9 and 10 were extinct. See 2 BL.
CoMM. 238, 239.
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dictum. He tells us that he afterwards put it to the judges
of the court of Common Pleas that, from the actual decision
in the case, the correct deduction was that the descendants
of the more remote female paternal ancestor should be preferred to the descendants of the less remote female paternal
ancestor. For, if the brother of the purchaser's grandmother
is preferred to the brother of the purchaser's great-grandmother why should not the brother of the purchaser's mother be preferred to the brother of the purchaser's grandmother?-and in that case Edward Clere would have succeeded. But the judges adhered to their opinion. They had
followed the older cases in giving the preference to the
paternal ascendants. They were not inclined to carry this
preference of male to female any further than they were
obliged, even to satisfy the claims of logic. But the claims of
logic found a champion in Blackstone.' He had no difficulty
in showing that the logical consequence of the decision in
Clere v. Brook, and of the other rules of inheritance, was to
give the preference to the descendants of the more remote
female paternal ancestor rather than to the descendants of
the less remote. Largely in consequence of his advocacy the
logical view has received the sanction of the legislature."
6 Blackstone's view is set forth in note 5 supra.
7 Section 8 of The Inheritance Act of 1833 provides as follows: "Where
there shall be a failure of male paternal ancestors of the person from whom the
descent is to be traced, and their descendants, the mother of his more remote
male paternal ancestor, or her descendants, shall be the heir or heirs of such
person in preference to the mother of a less remote male paternal ancestor, or
her descendants; and where there shall be a failure of male paternal ancestors of
such person, and their descendants, the mother of his more remote male paternal
ancestor, and her descendants, shall be the heir or heirs of such person in preference to the mother of a less remote male maternal ancestor, and her descendants." 5 Tas COMPLETE STATUTES OF ENGLAND (1929) 120.
If the intestate had acquired his title by descent from his father, no one
could be admitted as an heir, at the common law in England, who was not related by blood to that father. Or if the intestate's mother was the purchaser
and he had acquired his title from her by descent, any one who took the inheritance had to be related by blood to her. But even where the ancestral property doctrine was applicable, the general doctrine advocated by Blackstone was
applicable as to collateral heirs claiming through remote lineal ancestors of the
intestate. See 2 BL. Comm. 238, 240.
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The question of priority of paternal over maternal ascendants has been raised in apparently- only one other case,
namely, Hawkins v. Shewen,8 decided as recently as 1823.
The question was whether a good title could be made to the
real estate involved which had been devised by Jane Shewen.
She was a first cousin once removed of the person last seised,
the one through whom she had apparently acquired title as
heir. The person last seised had apparently acquired his title
through Mary Jones, his mother. Mary Jones was a daughter
of Anthony Jones, the first purchaser. She had married
Thomas Price, a fourth cousin of Anthony Jones; and the
person last seised was their son. The parents of Anthony
Jones were Lettice Rice Jones and David Jones. Thomas
Price and the father of the testatrix were descendants of
Sir Walter Rice; the latter was the great-grandfather of
Mary Jones and the father of Lettice Rice Jones. Sir John
Leach, the Vice Chancellor, held that the title of the testatrix could not be made without showing that the blood of
David Jones was extinct. That is to say, "where a person
seised of an estate ex parte materna, dies without issue,
the descendants of his maternal grandfather must all be extinct before any descendant of a remoter maternal ancestor
can inherit, however nearly related to the propositus, ex
parte materna." 9 The relatives of the maternal grandfather
were preferred to those of the maternal grandmother, as
the property had descended ex parte materna. This decision
applies the doctrine that Blackstone advocated. It may have
occasioned passage of the statute (Section 8 of the Inheritance Act of 1833) referred to by Holdsworth.' ° While the
general doctrine was not of much practical importance, Parliament embodied it in a statute in 1833." It has been abolished by The Administration of Estates Act of 1925.12 The
8 1 Sim. & St. 257, 57 Eng. Rep. 103 (1823).
9 Headnote to Hawkins v. Shewen, op. cit. supra note 8.
10 Note 7 supra.
11 Section 8 of The Inheritance Act, op. cit. supra note 7.
12 15 GEO. 5, C. 23, § § 45, 46.
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only collateral heirs capable of inheriting, under this Act are
brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. No remoter lineal ancestors than grandparents can inherit under the provisions
of this Act. If more than one of the grandparents survive the
intestate, they inherit equally (if, of course, they constitute
the heirs), and this, it seems, regardless of the source of the
intestate's title. There seems to be no priority as between
maternal and paternal uncles and aunts, regardless of the
source of the intestate's title.
The English Statute of Distributions of 1670 "8directed
that distribution "amongst the wife and children, or children's children if any such be or otherwise to the next of
kindred to the dead person in equall degree, or legally representing their stocks pro sua cuique jure according to the
lawes in such cases." Prior to this Act the husband was "entitled to the grant of adminstration of his wife's effects;
and consequently.

. .

he was entitled, as all administrators

were, to the exclusive enjoyment of the residue. Doubts,
however, arose, whether the husband's right was not superseded by the force of that Statute; and whether he was not
thereby bound to distribute her personal estate among her
next of kin." "- These doubts probably were occasioned by

the latter provision of the Statute set forth above. To obviate this uncertainty, the Statute of 29 Car. II, c. 3, sec. 25,
sanctioned the law as it existed prior to the Statute of Distributions. 11 If there were no lineal descendants, the father
was preferred to the mother, though they were in equal degree.16 But this preference of the male to the female ancestor, under the Statute of Distributions, was strictly con18
14

22 & 23 CAR. II, c. 10.
WnLms, A TREATISE ON THE LAW

or

EXECUTORS AND ADMIISTRATORS

(3rd Am. ed.) 1275.
15 Op. cit. supra note 14.
16 Blackborough v. Davis, 1 Salk. 251, 91 Eng. Rep. 221 (1701).
"When a child dies intestate, without wife or child, leaving a father, the latter is entitled, as next of kin, in the first degree, to the whole of the personal
estate of the intestate, exclusive of all others." WuznA.mS, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 1292.
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fined to the father and mother. All other ancestors in the
same degree and all descendants, male and female, succeeded together.
The general common-law doctrine in England that males
were preferred to females in the law of succession to intestate property never obtained a footing in the United
States. Kent said that it was "considered to be incompatible
with that equality of right, and that universal participation
in civil privileges, which it is the constitutional policy of
this country to preserve and inculcate." "I Some of the
early statutes provided that no preference should be given
to males nor to the eldest male; 18 and even where there is
no express statutory provision the doctrine has been rejected. The general type of legislation on this subject, under which the question of a preference has been raised, is
that the intestate property shall descend or be distributed
to the next of kin in equal degree equally. This is, in substance, the same as the provision in the English Statute of
Distributions; but in most states in this country the limited
preference that existed under the latter Statute has not
been adopted. The general rule, applicable in England under the Statute of Distributions, that equals in degree take
equal portions, regardless of sex, is likewise the general rule
in the United States with respect to both realty and personalty. 9 The common-law rule, however, has been applied
in a New York case where the nearest collateral heir was
so remote as to be unprovided for specifically by the statute.
In Hunt v. Kingston 20 the nearest relatives of the intestate
were great-aunts, descendants of great-aunts, and a greatuncle. The court held that the great-uncle inherited to the
17
1s

4 KEN-'s Comm. (14th ed.) 383.

Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day 166, 3 Am. Dec. 265 (1808); Bray v. Taylor,

36 N. 3. Law 415 (1872); Bell v. Dozier, 1 Dev. 333 (1827).
19 This general rule is subject to the operation of the ancestral property

doctrine, wherever that doctrine is recognized.
20

23 N. Y. S. 352 (1893).
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exclusion of the females in the same degree, reasoning that
as the common-law rule had not been superseded with respect to this class of heirs it was applicable. Under some
statutes the paternal kin in the ascending line are preferred
to the maternal kin in the same degree.21
"III. A third rule or canon of descent is this: that where
there are two or more males, in equal degree, the eldest only
shall inherit; but the females all together."
Blackstone's comment on this Canon. "As if a man hath
two sons, Matthew and Gilbert, and two daughters, Margaret and Charlotte, and dies; Matthew his eldest son shall
alone succeed to his estate, in exclusion of Gilbert the second
son and both the daughters; but, if both the sons die without issue before the father, the daughters Margaret and
Charlotte shall both inherit the estate as coparceners." '
Kent's comment. "A good deal of importance was attached
to the claims of primogeniture in the patriarchal ages; and
the first-born son was the earliest companion of his father,
and the natural substitute for the want of a paternal guardian
to the younger children. The law of Moses gave the eldest
son a double portion, and excluded the daughters entirely
from the inheritance, so long as there were sons, and descendants of sons; and when the inheritance went to the
daughters in equal portions, in default of sons, they were
obliged to marry in the family of their father's tribe, in order to keep the inheritance within it.... At Rome the law of
succession underwent frequent vicissitudes. The law of the
21 For instance, the Delaware statute provides: "If the intestate left no
issue or their descendants, nor brothers or sisters or the issue of any deceased
brother or sister, then the estate goes to the intestate's father." DEL. Rzv. CODz

(1915) § 3267.
As between paternal and maternal relatives, at certain designated junctures,
some statutes provide for division of the inheritance into moieties, one of which
goes to the paternal, and the other to the maternal kindred, regardless of the
number in each class. FnoRImA REv. GEN. STAT. (1920) § 3618.
1 2 BL. Comm. 214.
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Twelve Tables admitted equally male and female children
to the succession. The middle jurisprudence under the praetors departed from this simplicity, and fettered the inheritance of females. The Voconian law declared women incapable of inheriting; but, in the time of Cicero, the praetors extended or restrained the Voconian law at pleasure. It was
gradually relaxed under the Emperors Claudius and Marcus
Antonius, until at last the Emperor Justinian, in his 118th
novel, destroyed all preference among the males, and all
distinction between the sexes in respect to the law of descent, and admitted males and females to an equality in the
right of succession, and preferred lineal descendants to collateral relations.
"The preference of males to females, and the right of primogeniture among the males, is the established and ancient
rule of descent in the English common law. The right of
primogeniture was derived from the martial policy of the
feudal system, after it had attained solidity and maturity.
It is supposed to have been unknown, or not in use, among
the ancient Germans or the Anglo-Saxons, prior to the Norman Conquest. They admitted all the sons equally to the
inheritance; but the weight of authority is, that females were
most generally excluded, even in the primitive ages of the
feudal law. When the feudal system became firmly established, it was an important object to preserve the feud entire,
and the feudal services undivided, and to keep up a succession of tenants who were competent, by their age and
sex, to render the military services annexed to their grants.
The eldest son was the one that first became able to perform
the duties of the tenure, and he was, consequently, preferred
in the order of succession. Females were totally excluded,
not only from their inability to perform the feudal engagements, but because they might, by marriage, transfer the
possession of the feud to strangers and enemies.
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"But these common-law doctrines of descent are considered to be incompatible with that equality of right, and that
universal participation in civil privileges, which it is the constitutional policy of this country to preserve and inculcate.
The reasons which led to the introduction of the law of primogeniture, and preference of males, ceased to operate upon
the decline and fall of the feudal system; and those stern
features of aristocracy are now vindicated by English statesmen upon totally different principles. They are not only
deemed essential to the stability of the hereditary orders, but
they are zealously defended in an economical point of view,
as being favorable to the agriculture, wealth, and prosperity
of the nation, by preventing the evils of an interminable subdivision of landed estates. It is contended, that the breaking
up of farms into small parcels, and the gradual subdivision
of these parcels into smaller and still smaller patches, on the
descent to every succeeding generation, introduces a redundant and starving population, destitute alike of the means
and of the enterprise requisite to better their condition. The
appeal is boldly and constantly made to the wretched condition of the agriculture and agricultural improvement of
France... under the action of the new system of equal partition. It is declared to be an enemy to all enterprising and
permanent improvements in the cultivation of the soil and
employment of machinery; to all social comfort and independence, as well as to the costly erections of art and embellishments of taste. On the other hand, Dr. Smith, the
author of the Wealth of Nations, severely condemns the
policy of primogeniture, as being contrary to the real interests of a numerous family, though very fit to support the
pride of family distinctions. The Marquis Gamier, the
French translator of that work, is also a decided advocate
for the justice and policy of the principle of equal partition; and the Baron De Stael Holstein is of the same opinion, even in an economical point of view. He considers the
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equal division of estates much more favorable to the wealth
and happiness of society, than the opposite system." 2
In the law of succession to intestate property, "primogeniture" has been defined as follows: "The right that belongs
to the eldest son or, failing lineal descendants, the eldest
male in the next degree of consanguinity, to take all the
real estate of which the ancestor died seized and intestate,
to the exclusion of all female and younger male descendants
of equal degree." I Under Canon HI, the person taking intestate property as heir was the eldest son, if he survived
the ancestor. If he predeceased the ancestor, leaving no issue surviving, then the second eldest son inherited. In the
event of an entire failure of male issue, if there were more
than one daughter, they took equally, the husband of the
eldest being required to do homage.4 "If there was only one
daughter, she inherited in the same manner as the eldest
son. In the event of an entire failure of issue, male or female,
the grandchildren succeeded in the same manner as the ancestor's children, subject of course, to primogeniture and the
rule as to the preference of males over females." ' Suppose
A., the intestate, had two sons, B. and C. If B. was the eldest
son and predeceased A., leaving two sons, the eldest son of
B., surviving A., would, under the Canons of Descent, succeed to the realty of A. If B. had left only two daughters,
they would have succeeded in equal moieties to the realty of
A., to the exclusion of C. If A. had left only two daughters,
D. and E., they would have succeeded to A.'s realty as coparceners. But if both D. and E. had predeceased A., and D.
had left a son and a daughter, and E. had left two sons, the
son of D. would have succeeded to a half of A.'s realty and
the eldest son of E. would have succeeded to the other half.
2

4 KENT's COmm. (14th ed.) 376, 377, 378, 382, 383, 384.

s Wzsm's NE W INmmATIONAL DIcTxzOARY (1918).
4 R1 py, CAsEs oN TnE LAw or SuccEssoN 46, note 2.
5 Op. dt. supra note 4.
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Primogeniture, the preference of males to females, and the
doctrine of representation applied in infinitum in the lineal
descending line. Primogeniture seems to have been applied in
the collateral line to brothers, the eldest brother and his descendants inheriting lands before any younger brother or
any of his descendants.6 There appears to be no authority as
to whether it applied to remoter collaterals, such as uncles.
Primogeniture was abolished in England by The Administration of Estates Act,' which went into effect on January
1, 1926.
Professors Reppy and Tompkins state the following brief
history of primogeniture in this country: "In a few of the
colonies the doctrine of primogeniture gained a temporary
recognition. It existed in Rhode Island until the year 1770;
in New Jersey, New York, Georgia and a few other states
until the Revolution; in Maryland as late as 1815. In New
Jersey the rule was modified by the Descent Act of 1780,
under which the eldest son was given a double portion of
the estate. A similar state of affairs existed in Massachusetts,
Connecticut and Delaware. Under the Descent Act of 1817
the last vestige of primogeniture was eliminated in New Jersey, except in the case of a natural trust, in which case the
estate descended to the eldest son, according to the law of
primogeniture, such estates not being within the purview
of the New Jersey statutes; and except in the case of an
estate tail, until changed by the Descent Act of 1820." 8
Canon III "is sometimes expressly abolished [in this country] and sometimes by the establishment of another course of
descent." ' But it has been held that the abolition of primogeniture does not affect the descent of estates tail, where such
6

2 LORD CoxE's FIRST INSTITUTE 204.

7

15 GEo. 5, C. 23, § 45.

8 REPPY & TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
OF W mts, DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 81.
9 3 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW oF REAL PROPERTY 360.
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estates subsist, and "they descend as at common law, and
therefore by primogeniture." " Nor does the abolition "affect trusts, which will still descend to the heir at common
law." 11
Section 52 of The Administration of Estates Act 12 in England excepts the devolution of an entailed interest as an
equitable interest. If the tenant in tail has not barred the
entailed interest, it descends to the heir in tail as ascertained
under the common law. So if a gift is made to the donee and
the heirs of his body, primogeniture would be applicable. 3
Cooper, in his Notes on the 118th Novel, says that the
Roman law called to the succession, in case of intestacy, "all
legitimate children without distinction . . . and, of course,

neglecting all consideration of primogeniture." 14 The general principle was that equals in degree inherited equally,
without regard to difference of sex. These principles were
applicable under the English Statute of Distribution of 1670.
"IV. A fourth rule, or canon of descents, is this: That
the lineal descendants, in infinitum, of any person deceased
shall represent their ancestor; that is, shall stand in the same
place as the person himself would have done, had he been
living."
Blackstone's comment on this Canon. "Thus the child,
grandchild, or great-grandchild (either male or female) of
the eldest son succeeds before the younger son, and so in
infinitum. And these representatives shall take neither more
nor less, but just so much as their principals would have done.
10 'nToPsON, op. dt. supra note 9; Collamore v. Collarnore, 158 Mass. 74,
32 N. E. 1034 (1893).
11 THOMPSONz, op. cit. supra note 9.
12
13

15 Go. 5, c. 23.

14

COOPER'S JUSTnMN'S INSTITUTES' (1852)

See Wumums, PniNcius op THE LAw oF REAL PROPRERY (24th ed.)
103 (note z), 394. See, also, article by Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates
in America, 27 CoL. L. R.v. 24.
545.
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As if there be two sisters, Margaret and Charlotte, and Margaret dies leaving six daughters; and then John Stiles, the
father of the two sisters, dies without issue; these six daughters shall take among them exactly the same as their mother
Margaret would have done, had she been living,-that is,
a moiety of the lands of John Stiles in coparcenary; so that,
upon partition made, if the land be divided into twelve parts,
thereof Charlotte, the surviving sister, shall have six, and her
six nieces, the daughters of Margaret, one apiece.
"This taking by representation is called succession in
stirpes, according to the roots; since all the branches inherit
the same share that their root, whom they represent, would
have done. And in this manner also was the Jewish succession directed; but the Roman somewhat differed from it.
In the descending line the right of representation continued
in infinitum, and the inheritance still descended in stirpes,as if one of three daughters died, leaving ten children, and
then the father died; the two surviving daughters had each
one-third of his effects, and the ten grandchildren had the
remaining third divided between them. And so among collaterals, if any person of equal degree with the persons represented were still subsisting (as if the deceased left one
brother, and two nephews the sons of another brother), the
succession was still guided by the roots: but if both of the
brethren were dead, leaving issue, then (I apprehend) their
representatives in equal degree became themselves principals,
and shared the inheritance per capita, that is, share and
share alike; they being themselves now the next in degree
to the ancestor, in their own rinht, and not bv right of representation. So if the next heirs of Titius be six nieces, three
by one sister, two by another, and one by a third, his inheritance, by the Roman law, was divided into six parts,
snd one Oiven to each of the nieces: whereas the law of
England in this case would still divide it only into three
parts, and distribute it per stirpes, thus: One-third to the
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three children who represent one sister, another third
to the two who represent the second, and the remaining third
to the one child who is the sole representative of her mother.
"This mode of representation is a necessary consequence
of the double preference given by our law, first to the male
issue, and next to the first-born among the males, to both
which the Roman law is a stranger. For if all the children
of three sisters were in England to claim per capita, in their
own right as next of kin to the ancestor, without any respect
to the stocks from whence they sprung, and those children
were partly male and partly female, then the eldest male
among them would exclude not only his own brethren and
sisters, but all the issue of the other two daughters; or else
the law in this instance must be inconsistent with itself, and
depart from the preference which it constantly gives to the
males and the first-born among persons in equal degree.
Whereas, by dividing the inheritance according to the roots,
or stirpes, the rule of descent is kept uniform and steady; the
issue of the eldest son excludes all other pretenders, as the
son himself (if living) would have done; but the issue of two
daughters divide the inheritance between them, provided
their mothers (if living) would have done the same; and
among these several issues, or representatives of the respective roots, the same preference to males and the same right
of primogeniture obtain as would have obtained at the first
among the roots themselves, the sons or daughters of the deceased. And if a man hath two sons, A. and B., and A. dies
leaving two sons, and then the grandfather dies; now the
eldest son of A. shall succeed to the whole of his grandfather's estate; and if A. had left only two daughters, they
should have succeeded also to equal moieties of the whole,
in exclusion of B. and his issue. But if a man hath only three
daughters, C.. D., and E., and C. dies, leaving two sons, D.
leaving two daughters, and E. leaving a daughter and a son
who is younger than his sister; here, when the grandfather
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dies, the eldest son of C. shall succeed to one-third, in exclusion of the younger; the two daughters of D. to another
third in partnership; and the son of E. to the remaining
third, in exclusion of his elder sister. And the same right of
representation, guided and restrained by the same rules of
descent, prevails downwards in infinitum."'
Canon IV states the common-law doctrine of inheritance
per stirpes or by representation. In determining the amount
of the intestate's property to which a remote heir or relative
is entitled, inheritance per stirpes is generally used in contradistinction to inheritance per capita. These two terms
have occasioned a great amount of difficulty in the cases in
construing wills, deeds, life insurance contracts, and other
instruments. The doctrine of inheritance per stirpes or by
representation is important also in connection with the doctrine of advancements to heirs, that is, in determining whether the remote heir takes in his own right or takes as a representative of the immediate heir hence subject to the advancements. In the latter type of cases the courts generally use
the term rePresentation;whereas, in distinguishing this type
of inheritance from inheritance Per cabita, they use the term
Per stirPes. However, there is no material distinction in the
meaning of the two terms (inheritance by representation
and inheritance per stirpes).
Inheritance per stirpes signifies that the particular descendants (remote heirs) inherit such portion (share or interest) only as their immediate ancestor would have inherited
if he had survived the death of the intestate. Thus, if the
intestate has left a son, and the children of a deceased son,
as his only lineal descendants and as the only relatives who
are entitled to inherit his property, one-half of his property
would be inherited by his surviving son and the other half
by the children of the deceased son. The children of the de1

2 Br.. CoMM. 217, 218, 219.
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ceased son, that is, the grandchildren of the intestate, inherit the same portion that their father (the son of the intestate) would have inherited if he had survived the death
of the intestate. On the other hand, if the intestate had two
sons, both of whom predeceased him, one leaving two sons
and the other three sons, and these grandsons survived the
intestate and constituted the only heirs entitled to his property under the statutes of the particular jurisdiction, they
would, in some states in this country, inherit per capita,that
is, each one would be entitled to one-fifth of the intestate's
property.'
As Canon IV is stated, it applies to inheritance per stirpes
by lineal descendants. But Blackstone discusses inheritance
per stirpes by collateral descendants under this Canon instead of under Canon V. He uses the word descendants, instead of children or issue, in stating the Canon. According to
his discussion, he uses the word descendants as meaning remote, as well as immediate, lineal descendants, that is, as
including children, grandchildren and so on in the descending
line. His use of this word includes within its meaning collateral descendants, as well as lineal descendants.
The English common law rigidly adhered to the doctrine
of inheritance per stirpes in the lineal descending line; that
is, representation took place in infinitum in the lineal descending line, subject, of course, to the doctrines of preference of males to females and primogeniture. Stephen illustrates these principles as follows: "As if a man hath two
sons, A. and B., and A. dies, leaving two sons, and then the
grandfather dies; now the eldest son of A. shall succeed to
the whole of his grandfather's estate; and if A. had left only
2 1 WOERNF.R, THE AmERwAx
LAW OF ADmiITRATIox (3rd ed.) 216.
In Blackstone's comment it is said that the doctrine of inheritance per stirpes
applied in infinitum in the lineal descending line, where, of course, the doctrines
of preference of males to females and primogeniture did not apply. Thus, if the
intestate had three daughters, all of whom predeceased him, one leaving two
daughters, one leaving three, and other leaving one, the inheritance would be
divided into three parts, instead of six.
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two daughters, they should have succeeded also to equal
moieties of the whole, in exclusion of B. and his issue. But
if a man hath only three daughters, C., D., and E., and C.
dies, leaving two sons, D. leaving two daugthers, and E.leaving a daughter and a son who is younger than his sister;
here, when the grandfather dies, the eldest son of C. shall
succeed to one-third, in exclusion of the younger; the two
daughters of D. to another third, in partnership; and the
son of E. to the remaining third, in exclusion of his elder
sister." I
At the common law in England the doctrine of representation in inheritance overrides, to some extent, the doctrine
of preference of males to females. Thus the daughters, granddaughters and other lineal female descendants of the eldest
son who died in his father's lifetime will exclude the father's
second son from the inheritance.
The Roman law, like the English common law, adhered
rigidly to the doctrine of inheritance per stirpes in the lineal
descending line. In Cooper's Justinian'sInstitutes 4 the civil
law is stated as follows: "A son, a daughter, and a grandson or granddaughter by another son, are called equally to
the inheritance; nor does the nearest exclude the more remote; for it seems just that grandsons and granddaughters
should succeed in the place of their father. By like reason,
a grandson or granddaughter by a son, and a great-grandson
or great-granddaughter by a grandson, are all called together.
And since grandsons and granddaughters, great-grandsons
and great-granddaughters, succeed in the place of their parent, it seemed convenient that inheritances should not be
divided into caPita, but into stirpes,-so that a son should
possess one-half, and the grandchildren (however numerous)
of another son, the other half of an inheritance..."
3 1 STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENOLAND (Partly founded on Blackstone) (Sth ed.) 410, 411.
4 Lib. III, Tit. I, § 6.
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Blackstone's comment on this Canon indicates that in the
collateral line representation in infinitum prevailed. He says
that if the "next heirs of Titius be six nieces, three by one
sister, two by another, and one by a third . . . the law of
England... would.., divide [his inheritance] ... only into

three parts, and distribute it per stirpes, thus: One-third to
the three children who represent one sister, another third to
the two who represent the second, and the remaining third
to the one child -whois the sole representative of her mother."
While the representatives of the three sisters of Titius are
in equal degree of relationship to the intestate, yet they inherit per stirpes and not per capita; they do not inherit in
their own right as the nearest collateral relatives (in determining the amount each takes), but they take by representation. If the doctrine of representation applied to nieces, it
would seem to have been applicable to remoter collateral
relatives. That is to say, the doctrine was applicable in infinitum in the collateral line. Blackstone says that the Roman law differed somewhat from the English common law in
the application of the doctrine of representation in the collateral line. Thus, in the above illustration, the nieces of
Titius, being in the same degree of relationship to him,
would, under the Roman law, inherit per capita, that is, they
would inherit in their own right and not by representation.
The inheritance would be divided into six parts and each
niece would inherit a sixth interest. But if any person of
equal degree of relationship with any person represented
survived the intestate, the inheritance "was still guided by
the roots." Thus if one of the sisters of Titius had survived
his death, she would have inherited a third, and the remaining two-thirds would have been inherited per stirpes by the
children of each of the two deceased sisters.
In the collateral line the English Statute of Distributions
of 1670 allowed representation only in the case of nephews
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and nieces of the intestate.5 Section 4 of this Statute provided that there should be no representation admitted
among collaterals after brothers' and sisters' children. In the
cases decided under this Statute the following principles
were developed: (1) When nephews and nieces concur with
a brother or sister of their deceased uncle or aunt, they succeed per stirpes;6 (2) When nephews and nieces concur
alone, they succeed per capita;1 (3) When uncles and aunts
concur with a deceased uncle's son, there is no representation in favor of the cousin-german, and the uncles and aunts
succeed to the personalty;' (4) When grandnephews and
grandnieces concur alone, they succeed per capita;9 (5)
When brothers and sisters of the intestate concur alone, they
succeed to his personalty per capita;1" (6) When grandnephews and grandnieces, grandchildren of a deceased brother of the intestate, concur with nephews and nieces, children
of other deceased brothers and sisters of the intestate, the
nephews and nieces succeed to the personalty;" and (7)
When the children of the intestate's brother or sister concur with the children of a halfbrother or halfsister, they
5 Welch v. Welch, 2 Freem. 189, 22 Eng. Rep. 1153 (1692); Pett's Case,
1 P. Wins. 25, 24 Eng. Rep. 280 (1700).
6 In Welch v. Welch, op. cit. supra note 5, the court stated this principle
as follows: "If the intestate had three brothers, and two of them being dead,
and one of them left three or more children, and the other one child only, and
the other brother be living, the share of the one child shall be equal to the share
of all the three of the other brother, because there they claim as representatives . ..
7 Welch v. Welch, op. cit. supra note 5. Thus if the intestate had three
brothers, all of whom predeceased him, one leaving one child, another six, and
another two, these children of the three deceased brothers of the intestate would
share equally in the intstate's personalty, as next of kin; that is, they would
succeed per capita.
8 "A man dies intestate, leaving an unle and uncle's son, and the only
ouestion was, Whether the son of the deceased Vknde should come in for a
distribution with the living uncle, by the Statute of Distributions? And all the
court were of the opinion that he should not." Maw v. Harding, Prec. Ch. 28,
24 Ene. Rep. 15 (1691).
9 See Davers v. Dewes, 3 P. Wins. 40, 24 Eng. Rep. 961 (1730).
10 Cf. Watts v. Crooke, Show. Par. Cas. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 74 (1690).
11 Pett's Case, op. cit. supra note 5.
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2 These illustrations exemplify the folsucceed per capita."
lowing principles that were applied under the Statute of Distributions in England with reference to the doctrine of representation, as this doctrine was applied in the collateral
line: (1) Equals in degree inherited equally; (2) Representation was limited to the intestate's nephews and nieces;
(3) Representation was only resorted to to prevent the exclusion of persons in a remoter degree; and (4) Collateral heirs
of the halfblood came within the doctrine of representation.'
In the lineal descending line, representation was applied
in infinitum, under the Statute of Distributions. It was only
in the collateral line that there was any restriction. 4
The Administration of Estates Act of 1925 in England
provides expressly for inheritance per stirpes by the issue of
children of an intestate; 1 5 and in Williams and Eastwood on
Real Property it is said that since the statutory trusts allow
issue to take per stirpes, first cousins would inherit per
stirpes, under the section of this statute providing for uncles
and aunts.' The doctrine of representation does not seem
to be applicable in favor of any other relatives of an intestate
in England, where this Statute applies, in the law of succession to realty and personalty.
In Williams and Eastwood on Real Property the effect of
the changes made by The Administration of Estates Act,
with respect to Canons II, III, and IV, is stated as follows:
"Males are not preferred to females, nor the elder male
preferred to the younger; and, with regard to descendants,
all descendants of equal degree take equally, and children
take per stirpes the share of their deceased parent [referring
to the issue of deceased children of the intestate and to first
cousins]. . 17
12 See Bowers v. Littlewood, 1 P. Wn2s. 594, 24 Eng. Rep. 531 (1719).
18 See Bowers v. Littlewood, op. it. supra note 12.
14 Welch v. Welch, op. cit. supra note 5. But see note 24, infra.
15 15 G~o. 5, c. 23, section 47, subsection 1 (i).
i
Page 405,\ note y.

17 Page 406.
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The doctrine of representation seems to be in force generally in the United States, as far as lineal descendants are
concerned. There is, however, little authority in the cases
dealing with the extent of the application of the doctrine.18
The general rule seems to be that lineal descendants in unequal degree of consanguinity to the intestate inherit per
stirpes. 9 Thus if the intestate leaves B., a son, living, and D.
and E., children of another son who has predeceased the intestate, as his only heirs and lineal descendants, B., the son,
and D. and E., the grandsons, stand in different degrees of
consanguinity to the intestate; and B. will, therefore, be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and D. and E. to the
other half, as tenants in common. That is, lineal heirs of a
deceased heir of the intestate take by representation and
not as direct heirs, in determining the amount inherited,
where the descent is arrested in an heir of equal degree of
consanguinity to the intestate as their deceased ancestor.
But where the lineal heirs are all of equal degree of consanguinity to the intestate, as where all are grandchildren,
in some jurisdictions they inherit per capita and not per
stirpes2 The latter is said to be 'the minority rule in this
country.' Under the English common law, the grandchildren,
where they constitute the only class of heirs, are said to inherit per stirpes;2 but under the English Statute of Distribu18 Kent says that the doctrine of representation applies to the issue of children or of grandchildren, "and so on to the remotest degree," and that this rule
"probably is to be found in the laws of every state in the Union." 4 KENT's
CoMM. (14th ed.) 390. But see note 27, infra.
19 DESCENT AND DIs=murzox, 9 R. C. L. 30; 4 KENT'S Comm. (14th ed.)
390, 391.
20 In re Martin's Estate, 120 AtI. 862 (Vt. 1923). See Cox v. Cox, 44 Ind.

368, 372 (1873).

21 3 THomPsoN, COmmENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PaOPERTY,
§ 2323.
22 "The rule of inheritance per stirpes is rigidly adhered to in the English
law of descent of real estates. Parceners, in one single instance, do inherit per
capita, but this is where the claimants stand not only in equal degree, but are
eptitled in their own right, as daughters or sisters of the common ancestor. They
never take per capita when they claim the land jure representationis;and, there-

fore, if a man hath two daughters, and they both die in his lifetime, the eldest
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tions of 1670, while it is said that "there may be representatives by grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, without restriction, because the restriction is only among collaterals,
and there it goes oxily to children," 2 yet where the lineal descendants are all of equal degree of consanguinity to the intestate, as where all are grandchildren, or great-grandchildren, they inherit as next of kin, that is, per capita.2" This is
in accord with the general spirit and policy of the Statute of
Distributions of 1670, which aimed at a just and equal distribution. The general principle applicable under this Statute
is that equals in degree inherit equally.
In the collateral line the doctrine of representation applies
in some jurisdictions to descendanis, in whatever degree, of
brothers and sisters of an intestate. Thus it has been applied in favor of grandnephews and grandnieces, so that
they are entitled to share in the inheritance per stirpes with
surviving nephews and nieces.25 Some statutes provide expressly that the children or grandchildrenof deceased brothers and sisters of an intestate shall inherit by representation. 6 Where the lineal descendants of brothers and sisters
of the intestate are all in the same degree of consanguinity,
such as nephews and nieces or grandnephews and grandleaving three, and the youngest one daughter, these four granddaughters, though
in equal degree, yet claiming by right of representation, they inherit per stirpes,
and the one of them takes as large a portion as the other three." 4 KENT's Comm.
(14th ed.) 391, 392.
23 Welch v. Welch, 2 Freem. 189, 22 Eng. Rep. 1153 (1692).
24 "If a father have three children, John, Mary, and Henry, and they all
die before the father, John leaving, for instance, two children, Mary three, and
Henry four, and afterwards the father die intestate, in that case all his grandchildren shall have an equal share; for as his children are all dead, their children ihall take as next of kin. Such also would be the case with respect to the
great-grandchildren of the intestate, if both his children and grandchildren had all
died before him." WLLAMS, A TREATxSE ON Tvn LAW Or ExEcuXoRs Aim ADWINISTRATORS (3rd Am. ed.) 1285. See discussion in In re Martin's Estate, op.
cit. supra note 20.
25 Blake v. Blake, 85 Ind. 65 (1882); In re Strohmer's Estate, 226 N. Y. S.
886 (1933). Cf. In re Samson's Will, 257 N. Y. 358, 178 N. E. 557 (1931) (construing a will giving residue of estate to next of kin, according to the statute of
distributions).
26 CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1929) § 1386.
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nieces, and constitute the only class of heirs, some statutes
provide expressly that they shall inherit equally, that is, per
capita. 7 The doctrine of representation is applicable, under
some statutes, to the issue 28 of uncles and aunts of an in-

testate; under other statutes, it is applicable to descendants
of uncles and aunts.2 9 In some states the statutes limit the
doctrine of representation in the collateral line to children of
brothers and sisters of the intestate.8"
In defining and limiting the doctrine of representation, the
various statutes of descent and distribution in this country
have used three words to include the remote heirs of an intestate, namely, descendants, children, and issue. Blackstone
used the word descendants in stating Canon IV. The meaning of this word, as he used it, has been considered. The
choice of any of these words is important and has occasioned
a great amount of difficulty in construing statutes of descent
MAss. Gau. LAWS (1932) c. 190, § 3.
"By the statute of distributions of this State, these heirs [a niece and three
nephews], standing in the same degree of relationship to -the intestate, inherited
his estate in equal proportions. But by the statute of New York . . . these heirs
27

inherited per stirpes and not per capita .

. ."

Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112, 126,

19 Am. Dec. 353, 355 (1829).
28 "The intestate's brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, or other relations,
standing in the same degree, shall take per capita, that is to say, by persons; and
where a part of them are dead and a part are living, the issue of those dead
shall take per stirpes, that is to say, the share of their deceased parent." Axz.
Rav. CoDE AwN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 984.
29 "When the intestate's children, or brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts,
or any other relations of the deceased standing in the first and same degree alone
come into the partition, they shall take per capita, namely, by persons; and,
when a part of them being dead and a part living, the descendants of those dead
have right to partition, such descendants shall inherit only such portion of said
property as the parent through whom they inherit would be entitled to if alive."
TF.x. Cour.p. STAT. (1928) art. 2577.
80 The Michigan statute provides for inheritance by the brothers and sisters
of an intestate "and the children of deceased brothers and sisters"; "and if such
persons are in the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take equally,
otherwise they shall take by right of representation." MicH. ComP. LAws (1929)
§ 13440. In In re Chapoton, 104 Mich. 11, 61 N. W. 892 (1895), it is held that
the word "children" refers only to sons and daughters, and that grandchildren
of deceased brothers and sisters do not take by representation. The same construction was placed on a similar statute in Maryland by the court in Hoffman
v. Watson, 72 Atl. 479, 483 (Md. 1909). Cf. In re Klein's Estate, 116 N. W. 394
(Mich. 1908).
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and distribution in this country. A similar difficulty exists
in construing wills, deeds, and other instruments in which
any one of these words is used. It is said that "the word
'descendant,' according to its accurate lexicographical and
legal meaning, designates the issue of a deceased person,
and does not describe the child of a parent who is still living. The word is correlative of 'ancestor.' The word 'issue'
is a word of broader import, and may include the children
of a living parent as well as the children or descendants of
one who is dead. But in an accurate sense one cannot have a
living ancestor, nor can a living person, although he may
have children, have descendants." 1 Webster's definition of
"descendant" is as follows: "One who descends, as offspring,
however remotely;-opposed to ancestor or ascendant." He
defines "issue" as meaning: "Progeny; a child or children;
offspring. In law, sometimes in a general sense, all persons
descended from a common ancestor; all lineal descendants;
also, any one of such persons . . ." 82 In an Ohio case the

court says there is a "broad distinction between the terms
'children' and 'descendants,' the one indicating only lineal
descendants, while the other includes both lineal and collateral relations." 83 In an Illinois case the court said that
"the word 'descendant,' as defined by the standard dictionaries and by text-writers, means one who is descended lineally from another, to the remotest degree." 84 In a Virginia
case the court said: "While the words 'children' and 'descendants' [are] ... not synonymous, 'descendants' includes

'children--comprises issue of every degree.' "

In a Mis-

souri case the court said: " 'Descendants . . . includes all

who proceed from the body of the person named; as (children) grandchildren and great-grandchildren.'
31 Hillen v. Iselin, 39 N. E. 368, 371 (N. Y. 1895).
82

WEBSTa'S NEw INTERNAIONAL DICIONARY (1918).

33
34

Turley v. Turley, 11 Ohio St. 173, 181 (1860).
Wyeth v. Crane, 174 N. E. 871, 872 (Ill. 1931).
French v. Logan's Adm'r, 60 S. E. 622, 623 (Va. 1908).
Lich v. Lich, 138 S. W. 558, 564 (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1911).

35
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It is said that "the words 'child' or 'children,' in legal or
common parlance, do not include grandchild or grandchildren, or any others than the immediate descendants in the
first degree of the person named as ancestor." 11 This definition is the one that has been applied generally; and it accords with that given to the word children in the English
Statute of Distributions of 1670, in limiting the doctrine
of representation in the collateral line.
The word "issue" may mean only children; or it may mean
descendants generally, when used in wills, 8 deeds,3" contracts of life insurance,4 ° and other instruments; but when
used in statutes of descent and distribution, it generally is
construed to mean descendants generally, and is not limited
to children. 4
However, the context of a statute, or of an instrument, in
which any of these three words (children, issue, or descendants) is used, may limit or enlarge the generally accepted
meaning. Thus, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Kyle v.
Kyle,"2 construed the word "child," as used in the statute
of descent, to mean children or their descendants. Similar
variations in the meaning of the terms per stirpes, issue, and
descendants, have occurred in many cases in which the courts
have construed wills, deeds, and other instruments, in which
these terms have been used. Where the context of a statute
or the use of any of these terms in instruments does not reIn re Woodward's Estate, 86 N. W. 1004, 1007 (Minn. 1901).
Drake v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 221, 32 N. E. 114, 17 L. R. A. 664 (1892);
Sumner v. Wescott, 86 Conn. 217, 84 Atl. 921 (1912).
39 Robeson v. Cochran, 255 Ill. 355, 99 N. E. 649 (1912) (The court said:
"The word 'issue' means lineal descendants, although it may appear from the
context of the will or deed to have been used with the limited meaning of children, or chldren and grandchildren.").
40 Hemenway v. Draper, 91 Minn. 235, 97 N. W. 874 (1904) (Contract to
pay the amount of the policy "to the brothers and sisters, 'or their living issue,
according to the rights of representation.'").
41 Rice v. Burkhart, 130 Iowa 520, 107 N. W. 308 (1906); Alexander v.
Wallace, 8 Lea 569 (1881); Schafer v. Ballou, 35 Okl. 169, 128 Pac. 498 (1912).
42 18 Ind. 108 (1862).
37
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quire a different meaning, the generally accepted meaning
of each of these terms has been used.
Not only do difficult questions of construction of statutes,
wills, and other instruments arise in applying the doctrine of
representation, but in another connection the doctrine has
occasioned some conflict of authority and difficulty, namely,
the right to charge the inheritance or distributive share with
indebtedness to the estate as against persons who claim
through or under heirs or distributees. One view is that the
heir of a deceased child of an intestate takes the share in
his grandfather's estate which his parent would have taken
if living subject to deduction for his parent's debt to the
grandfather.4" The weight of authority seems to be that the
grandchild, in such a case, takes directly from his grandfather and in his own right, and not through and in the
right of his immediate ancestor, and so does not take subject to any deduction for such a debt."
W. D. Rollison.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
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DESCENT AND DISTIUTION, 9 R. C. L. 111.
Op cit. supra note 43.

